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WHY DO PATIENTS DEVELOP SEVERE PRESSURE ULCERS?  
A RETROSPECTIVE CASE STUDY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Background: 
Severe pressure ulcers are important indicators of failures in the organisation and delivery 
of treatment and care.  We have a good understanding of patient risk factors, but a poor 
understanding of the role played by the organisational context in their development.  This 
study focuses on the ways in which the organisational context can influence the 
development of severe pressure ulcers. 
Methods:  
The study was undertaken in six sites in Yorkshire, England.  A retrospective case study 
design was used.  Data were collected from a range of sources, including interviews with 
individuals with severe pressure ulcers and staff, and clinical notes, and used to construct 
accounts of eight individuals who developed severe pressure ulcers.  Sequential and 
iterative review, involving reviewers with different backgrounds, were used to validate the 
accounts and to identify explanations for the events observed. 
Results: 
Four accounts indicated that specific actions by clinicians contributed to the development of 
severe pressure ulcers.  But seven of the eight accounts indicated that they developed in 
organisational contexts where, (i) clinicians failed to listen and respond to patients’ or 
carers’ observations about their risks or the quality of their treatment and care, (ii) clinicians 
failed to recognise and respond to clear signs that a patient had a pressure ulcer or was at 
risk of developing one  and, (iii) services were not effectively co-ordinated.   
Conclusions: 
Patient accounts could only be partially explained in terms of specific events, or sequences 
of events.  The findings support the conclusion that there was general acceptance of sub-
optimal clinical practices in seven of the eight contexts where patients developed severe 
pressure ulcers. 
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Article Summary 
Strengths and limitations of this study 
 This study contributes to our understanding of a poorly understood process, the 
development of a severe pressure ulcer 
 Few previous studies have explicitly sought to discriminate between psychological 
and broader organisational explanations for adverse events in health care settings 
 The diversity of patients who develop severe pressure ulcers, and of the settings 
where they occur, raises a risk of sampling bias 
 The retrospective study design brings with it a risk of hindsight bias 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Pressure Ulcer Advisory Panel/ National Pressure Ulcer Advisory Panel 
(EPUAP/NPUAP) defines a pressure ulcer as, “localized injury to the skin and/or underlying 
tissue usually over a bony prominence, as a result of pressure, or pressure in combination 
with shear.” [1] Pressure ulcers are a significant source of pain and distress for the 
individuals who develop them. [2]  In recent years the importance of severe pressure ulcers 
as indicators of poor quality and safety of health services has been recognised.  Category 2 
ulcers or above, as rated on the EPUAP/NPUAP 1-4 scale, are classed as reportable incidents 
in official guidelines in the National Health Service (NHS) in England. [3] Category 3 and 4 
ulcers (which involve injury deep into the skin, muscle or bone) are widely termed severe 
pressure ulcers, and have to be reported as serious untoward incidents. [4] Pressure ulcers 
are also one of four patient safety indicators in a new NHS monitoring tool. [5]    
 
There are two distinct ways of thinking about patients’ risks of developing pressure ulcers.  
The first is based on the assumption that all PU risks are associated with patients’ health 
status or their behaviour.  The implication is that clinicians should focus on identifying 
patients who are at risk, assess the nature and scale of their risks, and design clinical 
interventions to reduce them.  We have a good understanding of patient risk factors. [6] The 
second way of thinking starts from a different assumption, which is that the quality of 
treatment and care can also influence patients’ risks of developing pressure ulcers.  Patients 
who are at risk are more likely to develop them in settings where quality of care is poor.  
The events at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, where at one point dozens of PUs 
were being reported every month, help to underline the significance of this point. [7]   
 
We currently have a relatively poor understanding of the ways in which the wider 
organisational context contributes to their prevention or development. A small number of 
studies have indicated that it plays a role, but the nature and significance of that role 
remains to be elucidated. [8] This study focuses on the ways in which the organisational 
context can influence the development of severe pressure ulcers. It focuses on identifying 
the best explanation for their development, using explanations derived from the patient 
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safety literature, which advances both psychological and sociological explanations for errors 
and adverse events [9].     
 
METHODS 
Severe pressure ulcers occur relatively rarely, and can develop in a wide range of settings, 
and it is not currently possible to predict who will develop them and who will not. [6] It was 
not therefore practical to study their development prospectively.  If, for example, we had 
prospectively identified patients with category 2 ulcers, in order to evaluate differences 
between those that developed a category 3 or 4 ulcer and those that did not, our presence 
would have drawn attention to the significance of the pressure ulcers.  It is likely to have 
prompted swift action by the local clinical team, and it seems reasonable to predict that few, 
or even none, of the category  2 pressure ulcers would have progressed to category 3 or 4.  
As a result, we would have biased our observations, possibly substantially, and could not 
have been confident that we had observed the whole development process, from the 
earliest signs and symptoms to the point where action was taken.  It was, though, possible 
to reconstruct the events that lead to the development severe pressure ulcers 
retrospectively.  We undertook a retrospective case study, where severe pressure ulcers 
were end-points, and also indicators of adverse outcomes of treatment and care.  A process 
tracing case study method was used, focusing on the experiences of eight individuals in 
Yorkshire, England. [10]  Each account took, on average, four months to create, from the 
initial interview with an individual to the signing off of a detailed account of the 
development of that individuals’ severe pressure ulcer. 
 
Primary Data Collection 
Research Ethics Committee approval and local research governance approvals from six study 
sites, were obtained.  Participants were sampled purposively, in order to maximise the 
diversity of individuals and the contexts in which they developed severe pressure ulcers.  
The settings included patients’ own homes, acute hospital medical and surgical wards, a 
community hospital and a nursing home during a period of respite care.  Sampling was also 
pragmatic: individuals who had developed a Category 3 or 4 pressure ulcer were identified 
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by members of the local tissue viability nurse teams.  Consent to participate was obtained 
from patients, and where appropriate also from their main carers.  
 
Data were collected by a field researcher with a non-clinical background from five sources, 
namely interviews with individuals who had developed a severe pressure ulcer (and where 
relevant also their main carers), interviews with clinical and other staff who had been 
involved in their care, clinical records, other documents relevant to the account such as 
critical incident reports, and relevant local policy documents, eg on assessment of risks of 
skin breakdown (Figure 1, Stage 1). Interviews were open-ended and in-depth, and are listed 
in Table 1.   70 interviews in total were conducted across the eight accounts.  The site 
principal investigator, who in each case was a nurse with a specialist interest in tissue 
viability, collated patient notes in a parallel exercise, following current practice in the NHS in 
England for root cause analyses.   
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Figure 1: Analysis and Review of Individual Accounts 
Stage 1 
                    Initial analysis    Document review 
Stage 2           
 
Stage 3      Comparison 
      Edit account  
 
 
 
Stage 4     Sub-group review 
 
    
 
Stage 5 Reviews by chief investigator and independent organisational 
psychologist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data collection: patient/carer interview, staff interviews,  
clinical records, local guidelines, other documents (eg staff rotas) 
Initial patient-
informed account 
Specialist nurse report 
Revised account 
Revised account + 
summative nursing 
judgement 
Final ‘true and fair’ 
account + summative 
judgements 
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Table 1: Number of People Interviewed by Account 
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Development of Retrospective Accounts 
The initial accounts each had two components.  The first consisted of verbatim passages of 
the patient/carer interview, which captured their explanations of the events that led to their 
severe pressure ulcers.  Second, a Microsoft Access database was created for each account, 
and used to organise decisions and actions into a chronological sequence, with patient and 
carer data in one column, other interview data in a second and records and other 
documentary sources in a third (see Figure 1, Stage 2).  The presentation of data in parallel 
columns made it possible to identify consistencies and inconsistencies between different 
data sources, and also the ‘strength’ of evidence available about each event, reflected in the 
number and quality of sources.  Data from the two components were used to identify a 
provisional timeline of events for each account. 
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A tissue viability nurse specialist from the relevant study site undertook a parallel review, 
based solely on available patient records and on other available documentation, including 
local guidelines and critical incident reports (ie not including the patient/carer interview).  
The method followed the guidance for reviews of critical incidents in the NHS in England.  
The nurse wrote a report, identifying key decisions and actions in chronological order, 
including departures from local guidelines.  The field researcher and tissue viability nurse 
specialist then met and compared their accounts, identifying consistencies and 
inconsistencies, eg actions that the nurse judged as important, that were not included in the 
initial patient-driven account.  Timelines were revised in the light of additional facts or 
insights generated (Stage 3).   
 
Refinement of the Accounts 
The subsequent stages of the analysis were designed to minimise some of the risks of bias 
known to be associated with retrospective analysis, notably hindsight bias, through review 
of each account by researchers with different backgrounds.  The initial summaries of each 
account were reviewed by a sub-group of nursing members of the research team; one 
independent hospital-based and one independent community-based tissue viability nurse 
specialist, and one of the Co-Chief Investigators (Stage 4).   
 
The accounts were analysed in two ways.  First, they were used to identify any errors – in 
the opinion of the sub-group – made in the decisions and actions recorded in each account.  
The specialist nurse reports, in particular, were important in helping to identify decisions 
made and actions taken, and hence provided an evidential  basis for identifying errors of 
omission or commission.  Each point was checked by going back to primary data sources.  
This produced an account that could be deemed to be ‘true and fair’.  On the basis of the 
account the clinical sub-group made expert judgements about departures from the 
treatment and care that each individual might reasonably have expected to receive.  These 
departures – such as failures to undertake proper risk assessments or to act when there 
were clear signs of skin redness or a category 1 ulcer – were possible precipitating, or 
contributing, events in the development of each severe pressure ulcer. Second, drawing on 
Yin’s strategy for discriminating between hypotheses in case studies, [11] clinical sub-groups 
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were asked to select one or more of five explanations for the events portrayed in an 
account.  The five explanations were that a severe pressure ulcer: 
 
1. Could not have been avoided;  
2. Developed following an isolated mistake made by a clinician;  
3. Developed following a sequence of unconnected errors;   
4. Theorganisational context  made development more likely; ; 
5. Developed for another reason, not covered by the first four. 
 
The first explanation captures a situation where clinical staff did everything that might 
reasonably have been expected.  The second reflects the dominant assumption in the 
patient safety literature, and is supported by some evidence about pressure ulcer 
development. [12,13] The third is a version of Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model, and again has 
some support in the pressure ulcer literature. [14-17]  The fourth, which also has some 
support in the pressure ulcer literature, focuses on the role of the organisational context, 
highlighted in the Institute of Medicine’s report, To Err Is Human. [18-21]  The implicit 
assumption underpinning this explanation is that sub-optimal treatment and care are 
provided, compared with the overall treatment and care that an individual might reasonably 
expect to receive, as judged by the clinical sub-group and subsequent reviewers.The fifth 
explanation is a logical extension to the first four, retaining the possibility of a novel 
explanation. 
 
The revised accounts and explanations were reviewed by the non-clinical Co-Chief 
Investigator and then by an organisational psychologist who had not been involved in the 
earlier stages (Stage 5).  The reviews focused on the coherence of each account, ie the 
extent to which the patient’s explanation and/or the nurses’ judgements made sense of the 
available evidence.  In the final step in the analysis, the eight accounts were analysed 
inductively, in order to identify themes that were common across the accounts. [22]  
 
RESULTS 
The study demonstrates that it is possible to develop detailed retrospective accounts of 
events, and to use them to judge which of five possible explanations best fits the available 
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evidence.  The large volumes of data collected and included in the timeline appear to have 
minimised problems that might have arisen as a result of ‘missing data’.  The iterative 
review process, involving reviewers with different backgrounds, appears to have minimised 
the risks of mis-interpretation.  As we note in the Discussion, though, the results may still be 
subject to a number of biases. 
 
The eight individuals were selected, in part, to maximise diversity (see Table 2).  There were, 
therefore, marked differences in their personal characteristics and in their treatment and 
care.  They were all, though, at high risk of developing pressure ulcers, or of existing 
pressure ulcers deteriorating.  Different explanations were offered by those interviewed for 
the development of severe pressure ulcers.  For example, in a number of accounts some 
staff interviewed blamed patients, on the basis that they had not complied with advice on 
managing their risks, eg shifting position regularly.   But patients themselves, in the same 
accounts, pointed to specific actions or omissions – failure to be turned regularly overnight, 
to provide a specialised mattress, or to respond to patients’ comments about their own risks.  
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Table 2: Individuals and settings 
Account Individual Setting 
1 38 year old woman with 
paraplegia 
Acute hospital, surgical 
ward 
2 65 year old woman with long-
term chronic neurological 
condition and undiagnosed 
infection 
Acute hospital, medical 
ward  
3 75 year old man with multiple 
chronic health problems and 
acute infection 
Community hospital, 
rehabilitation ward 
4 37 year old woman with long-
term degenerative congenital 
neurological condition  
At home 
5 90 year old man with multiple 
chronic health problems and 
undiagnosed acute illness 
Acute hospital, surgical 
ward 
6 39 year old woman in hospital 
for acute undiagnosed post-
operative  surgical 
complications  
Acute hospital, surgical 
ward 
7 65 year old man with 
quadriplegia 
At home, respite care and 
acute hospital 
8 89 year old woman who fell at 
home 
At home 
 
Elimination of hypotheses 
The diverse group of individuals all had the same outcome, a severe pressure ulcer.  In one 
account (#8) development was judged to be unavoidable, because the individual concerned 
developed a severe pressure ulcer in her own home, before any health professional saw her.  
The other seven accounts were deemed to involve avoidable severe pressure ulcers, both in 
the specialist nurse reports and the reviews by the clinical sub-group, on the basis that there 
was clear evidence of departures from the care that the patient might reasonably have 
expected to receive.  The second and third hypotheses were causal in nature: in one 
account (#3) there was a single precipitating event, and there was a sequence of 
precipitating events in three others (#2, #4 and #6).  In each of the four cases, though, 
reviewers judged that, while specific events played a role, they provided only part of the 
explanation.  In these cases, and in the three remaining ones – seven of the eight - the 
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clinical sub-group and subsequent reviewers all judged that the organisational context made 
development of a severe pressure ulcer more likely, compared with  the overall treatment 
and care that the individual might reasonably have expected to receive (see Table 3).  None 
of the eight accounts, in the view of the clinical sub-group or subsequent reviewers, 
supported an alternative explanation.   
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Table 3: Summative judgements by account 
 
Account Unavoidable Single/isolated 
event 
Sequence of 
events 
Environment 
made 
development 
more likely 
Other 
explanation 
1    ●  
2   ● ●  
3  ●  ●  
4   ● ●  
5    ●  
6   ● ●  
7    ●  
8 ●     
 
The organisational context 
The next step was to understand how the organisational context contributed to the 
development of severe pressure ulcers.  Inductive analysis of the eight accounts led to the 
identification of three main themes.  First, the ‘voices’ of the individuals who developed 
severe pressure ulcers were not heard by staff.  As noted above the individuals themselves 
behaved differently, and had different relationships with clinical staff, but failures to heed 
information were evident in several accounts.  For example, there were examples of 
patients making repeated appeals for pain and discomfort to be addressed, and expressing 
concerns about their own wellbeing, which were not heeded over periods of hours or even 
days.  In some instances these appeals seem to have been dismissed by staff: that is, they 
were heard but not taken seriously.  Patients were also blamed for the development of their 
pressure ulcers, on the basis that they did not comply with instructions they were given, and 
branded as ‘difficult’ - even when they had cognitive impairments. 
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Second, there were failures to recognise and act on warning signs.  Risk assessments were 
not undertaken when they should have been, in some cases only being undertaken several 
days after admission to an acute hospital ward.  Evidence of pre-existing clinical risks in 
records was not acted upon in six of the seven patients where the environment was judged 
to have contributed to development.  Action was not taken promptly when overt evidence – 
including the presence of a Category 2 pressure ulcer - was identified.  Conversely, there 
was evidence of poor documentation, so that adherence with patients’ care plans was not 
recorded, and in some instances direct evidence of skin redness or a pressure ulcer was not 
recorded.  Some healthcare assistants, who provided direct care, observed that they lacked 
the appropriate training to identify and record risks, or were not allowed to record them. 
 
Third, there were co-ordination failures, between patients, carers and staff, staff in the 
same setting, between staff in different settings in the same organisation (eg two wards), 
and between staff in different organisations.  Sometimes this was manifested as inter-
professional communication failure, and in some cases there was poor communication 
between the same professional groups in two locations.  One example of the latter came in 
a post-operative setting, where risks were not properly communicated between the 
anaesthetic recovery unit and the post-operative ward.  In other accounts records were not 
moved with an individual, so that key information was not available in a new setting.  It 
would be possible to interpret these points as clear evidence of failures by individuals or 
teams.  But there is a corollary to this point: nurses and healthcare assistants, in particular, 
could find themselves working in conditions where they had limited information about 
individuals and their risks, eg where patients had unknown diagnosis, or where records had 
not travelled with the patient from another location.  It is possible, therefore, that individual 
members of staff behaved reasonably in the contexts in which they found themselves.  The 
problems observed could be attributed to weaknesses in the overall co-ordination of 
treatment and care. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study sought to explain why patients develop severe pressure ulcers, by reconstructing 
events retrospectively, and then discriminating between alternative explanations for their 
development.   The principal explanation is that severe pressure ulcers  developed in 
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organisational contexts where there were failures in the overall governance of services.  
Specifically, they were characterised by one or more of, (i) clinicians failing to listen to 
patients’ or carers’ observations about their risks or the quality of their treatment and care, 
(ii) clinicians failing to recognise and respond to clear signs that  a patient had a pressure 
ulcer or was at risk of developing one, and, (iii) services not being effectively co-ordinated. 
In four of the accounts it was possible to identify specific, or causal, precipitating events, but 
in each case these events occurred in organisational  contexts where there were more 
general governance problems  
  
As noted in the Methods section, the study was designed in significant part in order to 
minimise biases in the data collection and analysis in a retrospective, observational study.  
This study suggests that a novel method, based on tracing back the course of events 
retrospectively from a known outcome, can be used to reconstruct key events.  The 
resulting accounts can be subjected to detailed review, and used to discriminate between 
alternative explanations for those events, and in the process preserve the ‘voices’ of the 
individuals affected.  This said, it is important to stress that there are a number of sources of 
bias, starting with selection bias: while the sampling strategy maximised diversity, the eight 
accounts are of individuals who were willing and able to consent to participate.   The initial 
presentation of the timelines, and the backgrounds of the analysts and reviewers, are also 
potential sources of bias.  A study team with different clinical or disciplinary backgrounds 
might have arrived at different judgements: for example, a team with backgrounds in 
human factors psychology might have placed greater weight on single events or sequences 
of events.  There is also a risk, using a retrospective design, of hindsight bias, particularly in 
reviewers assuming that staff must have known more than they actually did, and should 
therefore have acted differently [23]. The sequential and iterative review process has, we 
hope, served to minimise these biases, but we cannot say that they have been eliminated. 
 
We can interpret our findings in the context of the patient safety literature.  Reason [17] 
points out that investigations of accidents, across many industries, have changed 
significantly over the last fifty years.  An early focus on equipment failure gave way, in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, to a focus on human error, and then more recently to accounts that 
focused on systems and cultural issues.  In spite of this, many patient safety studies today 
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focus on causal explanations, based either on patient characteristics or errors made by 
individual clinicians.  These were represented by the second and third explanations.  
Relatively few focus on the wider organisational context, represented by the fourth 
explanation. [11]  The findings reported here only partially support the second or third 
explanation.  Only one patient was deemed to have an unavoidable severe pressure ulcer – 
because service providers were unaware of a fall at home – supporting the first explanation, 
and there was no support for a fifth, alternative, explanation.  The overall findings are, 
though, consistent with explanations that emphasise systems and culture.  
 
In the literature on the role of the organisational context on patient safety, explanations 
tend to emphasise either systems or culture.  The findings suggest that, for people who 
developed severe pressure ulcers, both were important.  In relation to systems-based 
explanations, the evidence about the poor co-ordination of services is broadly consistent 
with the arguments in To Err Is Human, namely that many safety failures are essentially 
system failures. [21] Drawing on the work of Perrow and others, the Institute argued that 
accidents are more likely in systems that are inherently complex – having many 
interconnected elements. [23] The findings in this study supported the observation that 
there were co-ordination failures between services that were loosely coupled with one 
another, ie generally run independently of one another, but needing to co-ordinate with 
one another.  For example, there were communication failures between wards at times 
when there were major ward re-organisations, so that key information was not passed on.  
Similarly, one of the community-based accounts  revealed that the individual was in receipt 
of a hospital service that community staff were unaware of, and hence could not take into 
account in risk assessment or care planning.   
 
At the same time, the failures to listen properly to patients – and even dismiss their 
concerns - and to act when there was a superficial pressure ulcer present, emphasise the 
importance of prevailing cultural norms.  The evidence suggests that the environments 
where severe pressure ulcers developed were ones where staff were under time pressure,  
where there were problematic relationships between staff groups, and where staff were 
defensive, and prepared to attribute failures to colleagues or to the ‘difficult’ behaviour of 
patients. This takes us away from a causal explanation, linking clinical actions to the 
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development of severe pressure ulcers, to one where the explanation is that prevailing 
norms substantially influenced the decisions and actions of individuals, which in turn led to 
the errors of commission and omission described above.  Clinicians adopted risky work 
routines that were not appropriate for the vulnerable patients that were in their care.  
Severe pressure ulcers developed in contexts where there was normalisation of deviance, a 
phenomenon where risky practices become the norm in a work setting, and staff either 
don’t recognise the extent of the risks they are taking, or are aware of them but 
underestimate them.[24] This resonates with wider concerns about the culture in parts of 
the NHS in England, where staff can be defensive and quick to blame others, rather than 
being open and prepared to learn from adverse events [6].   
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